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JUDICIAL NOTICE AND THE LAW’S “SCIENTIFIC”
SEARCH FOR TRUTH
Christopher Onstott*
Back when the Earth was the center of the Universe, Copernicus
started tracking the movement of different celestial bodies in the sky.1
Eventually, Copernicus’s observations led him to a troubling theory.2
The earth was actually revolving around the sun, meaning the Earth was
not the center of the universe.3 His heliocentric scientific theory later
proved to be a contentious issue, pitting wide-held religious beliefs
about the Earth’s place in a revolving universe against his own.4 Only
after years of painful upheaval in both the scientific and religious
communities did the paradigm shift to accept Copernicus’s dramatically
different theory.5 Indeed, his theory eventually landed his student,
Galileo, a heresy conviction and a sentence of life imprisonment.6
In Copernicus’s day, religion conclusively picked a particular
scientific theory and then denied the possibility that later theories could
eventually discredit the current one.7 Today, the law similarly ties itself
to a particular scientific theory—although somewhat unwittingly—
through the concept of judicial notice.
Through judicial notice, judges bind juries to accept a principle as
conclusive without taking evidence concerning that principle.8 Over
time, a repeatedly judicially noticed scientific or technical principle is
endowed by the law with a false sense of truth. But as when the Earth

* Christopher Onstott is a lawyer in Sacramento, California. This article would not be possible
without the helpful insight and review of Wendy Wagner and the support of Analie Onstott.
1. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY 15-16 (W. H. Freeman and Company 1999)
(1999).
2. Id. at 16.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 16-18.
5. Id. at 17.
6. Id.
7. See id. at 14-15.
8. See FED. R. EVID. 201.
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was the center of the universe, eventually, the scientific/technical
paradigm shifts, and the “truth” seems less clear. Red-faced, the law
reverses itself, hoping nobody noticed.
For example, in a 1902 nuisance action, the Iowa Supreme Court
issued judicial notice that “[i]t is well known that modern scientific
research has discovered means of disinfecting and deodorizing sewage,
so that it is practically innocuous.”9 In 1918, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court took the assertion even further, claiming that “[i]n Iowa it has
been repeatedly held that the court will take judicial notice of the fact
that sanitary science has developed means by which sewage may be
disinfected and deodorized so that it is rendered innocuous.”10 In 1931,
the same court took judicial notice of “the fact that modern science has
advanced to the point where sewage is capable of purification, and that it
is not only capable of purification, but can be easily and successfully
purified by the use of modern appliances.”11 Unfortunately, early 20thcentury sewage treatment may not have achieved the innocuous results
that these courts thought. It was not until 1925 that sewage treatment
plants began testing for lead in the water supply.12 Lead may be linked
to delays in physical and mental development in children and to kidney
problems and high blood pressure in adults.13 Even through the 1940s,
experts did not test for cyanide in the water supply.14 Cyanide has been
linked to nerve damage and thyroid problems.15 Additionally, sewage
treatment methods in the early 20th century were certainly not
environmentally “innocuous.” Sewage treatment often involved levels
9. Hollenbeck v. Marion, 89 N.W. 210, 212 (Iowa 1902).
10. Magnum v. Sunset Field, 174 P. 501, 503 (Okla. 1918) overruled by Okla. City v. West, 7
P.2d 888 (Okla. 1931).
11. Okla. City, 7 P.2d at 889. Missouri courts followed the Oklahoma court’s reasoning as
late as 1942. See Stewart v. Springfield, 165 S.W.2d 626, ***16 (Mo. 1942) (stating that “[c]ourts
take judicial notice of the fact that modern science has advanced to the point where sewage is
capable of purification and can be easily and successfully purified by the use of modern
appliances”).
12. The Standards of Purity for Drinking Water Supplied by Common Carriers in Interstate
Commerce released by the U.S. Treasury in 1914 and widely followed by urban treatment facilities
only set standards for bacteriological impurities. See generally THE AMERICAN WATER WORKS
ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF WATER QUALITY AND TREATMENT, AMERICAN WATER WORKS
ASSOCIATION (1941) [hereinafter, WATER QUALITY]. In 1925, the standard was revised to include
limits on lead, zinc, and copper in the water supply. Id. at 25.
13. See
National
Primary
Drinking
Water
Regulations,
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/mcl.html (last visited March 8, 2002). See also W.S. HOLDEN,
WATER TREATMENT AND EXAMINATION 83 (Longman Group Ltd, ed., Williams and Wilkins Co.
1970) (1970) (describing lead as the “commonest poisonous metal occurring in water supplies”).
14. See WATER QUALITY supra note 12, at 25.
15. See
National
Primary
Drinking
Water
Regulations,
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/mcl.html (last visited March 8, 2000).
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of chlorination believed toxic to some species of fish.16
Another scientific misstep occurred in 1900 when the U.S. Supreme
Court declared the following:
While [tobacco’s] effects may be injurious to some, its use over
practically the entire globe is a remarkable tribute to its popularity and
value. We are clearly of opinion that it cannot be classed with
diseased cattle or meats, decayed fruit, or other articles, the use of
which is a nuisance to the health of the entire community.17

Many medical experts now believe that tobacco is injurious not just
to “some” but to all, or nearly all, who use it.18 It has likely had
enormous effects on the health of the community.19
Judicial notice is a problem even when a scientific principle is not
totally discredited. Just becoming more widely disputed in the scientific
community is sufficiently problematic. For example, in 1928, a New
York court ordered a plaintiff to have an X-ray taken of his right
elbow.20 The appellate court reviewing the case took “judicial notice
that the X-ray is in common use and that the science and art thereof have
been developed to a point where, in the hands of specialists, there is little
16. See W.S. HOLDEN, supra note 13, at 53. “With chlorination of sewage effluents . . .
difficulties may be experienced in always providing sufficient chlorine without giving rise to excess
on occasions, which would be toxic in the discharge; concentrations of free chlorine as low as 0.050.2mg/l are toxic to some fish.” Id.
17. Austin v. Tenn., 179 U.S. 343, 345 (1900).
18. See, e.g., Jane E. Brody, Ailing Lungs Said to Improve When Smokers Stop, NEW YORK
TIMES , Nov. 16, 1994, at B8 (“Nearly all smokers experience an accelerated decline in lung
function.”) (citing a study released by The Journal of the American Medical Association). See also
William Reville, Not Enough Known About the Addiction of Smoking, THE IRISH TIMES, July 28,
1997. “Inhaled tobacco smoke contains hundreds of toxic substances and therefore almost all
smokers suffer from some form of tobacco-induced disorder. Id.
19. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, “Too Much Puff”: Persuasion, Paternalism, and
Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1212 (1988) (“Cigarette smoking is disastrous to
individuals and unparalleled in its harm to public health.”); National Center For Chronic Disease
Prevention and Health Promotion, Targeting Tobacco Use: The Nation’s Leading Cause of Death,
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/overview/oshaag.htm (last visited April 11, 2002) (stating that cigarette
smoke results in the death or disability of half of all regular users, causing 400,000 deaths a year in
the United States alone). Cigarette smoking causes more than $75 billion in medical expenditures
and an additional $80 billion in indirect costs a year. Id.
20. Gilbert v. Klar, 223 A.D. 200, 200-01 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928). It should be noted that in
Gilbert, the X-ray was ordered, not for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment, but for proof
in a courtroom. This goes against medical beliefs associated with risks and benefits of X-rays. See
ERIC J. HALL, RADIATION AND LIFE 223 (2d ed. 1984).
From the medical point of view, the small hazard to the patient from irradiation should
be more than compensated for by the information obtained in the test, as a contribution
to the diagnosis and treatment of his disease. If this is not the case, then there is no
excuse for any X-rays to be taken.
Id.
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or no danger.”21 Crude methods of radiation exposure detection methods
existed in 1928, but it was not until that year that a unit for measuring
radiation was even adopted.22 And “[a]lthough the basic techniques of
X-ray protection were well known by 1905 . . . , during the 1920’s into
the ‘30’s and even ‘40’s it was not uncommon to find medical X-ray
units with virtually no safety precautions.”23 Despite the improved
safety precautions now in place, the health effects caused by low-level
exposure to X-rays for medical-diagnosis purposes have periodically
been questioned by some.24
Even now, previously judicially noticed scientific and technical
principles can begin to lose their place atop the legal totem pole. For
example, several courts have judicially noticed the reliability, even
“infallibility,” of suspect identification through latent or “lifted”
fingerprints.25 In State v. Inman, the Maine Supreme Court took judicial
21. Gilbert, 223 A.D. at 200-01.
22. See Ronald L. Kathren & Paul L. Ziemer, The First Fifty Years, HEALTH PHYSICS: A
BACKWARD GLANCE 3 (1980) (stating that “the definition and adoption of the Roentgen, as this unit
was named, provided a physical basis for quantitative measurement, heretofore lacking, thus
permitting in a more or less unequivocal way, documentation of radiation exposures”). See also
Richard D. Terry, Historical Development of Commercial Health Physics Instrumentation, HEALTH
PHYSICS: A BACKWARD GLANCE 159 (1980) (“Also in 1928 the Second International Radiological
Congress met in Stockholm. The significant accomplishment of this meeting was the international
adoption of the Roentgen as the unit of measure of x-radiation.”).
23. See Kathren & Ziemer, supra note 22, at 2.
24. See John W. Gofman, RADIATION-INDUCED CANCER FROM LOW-DOSE EXPOSURE: AN
INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS 3-1 (1990) stating:
[A] surprising number of Americans—estimated at about 7 out of 10 every year—
receive some exposure to ionizing radiation from diagnostic X-rays in medicine and
dentistry . . . [b]ut the same diagnostics benefits are often obtainable at much lower
doses . . .” and estimating that “unnecessarily high X-ray doses cause about 1.5 million
unnecessary cancers per generation in the United States alone.
Id.
The estimate excluded second cancers induced by therapeutic radiation and cancers
induced by diagnostic nuclear medicine. Id. Gofman also states that “[t]he carcinogenicity of Xrays is even greater than the carcinogenity of A-bomb radiation.” See id. at 3-2. According to one
government source, medical X-rays account for 11 percent of the nation’s total radiation exposure,
trailing only radon and other natural sources of radiation. The effects of low-level exposure to
radiation may not show up for months or even years. See Radiation Protection Division Publication,
Ionizing Radiation Series No. 2, http://www.epa.gov/radiation/ionize2.htm (last visited April 10,
2002) (citing NCRP no. 93). See also Radiation and Your Environment, A Guide to Low-level
Radiation for Citizens of Florida, http://www.fipr.state.fl.us/fipr036.htm (last visited April 10,
2002) (reporting that X-rays for medical diagnosis and treatment account for an average of 30-40
mrem/year per American while all other man-made sources account for about 8/10 mrem/year).
There is debate about whether cancer-producing X-ray exposure is subject to a minimum threshold,
below which there would be no incidents of cancer, or if cancer rates caused by low-level exposures
are directly proportional to cancer rates produced from higher exposure levels. See id. (stating that
“this concept can neither be proven or disproven”).
25. See, e.g., Emerson v. State, 880 S.W.2d 759, 771 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1994) (Clinton, J.,
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notice that the “fingerprint method of identification is accurate.”26 The
court recognized the absolute reliability of latent fingerprint
identification, stating that “[w]hen one’s fingerprints are found in a
particular place, such person cannot be heard to say he was not at that
place at some time.”27 The court continued, holding that “[t]he
infallibility of fingerprints as a method of identification is now too
widely accepted to require citation of authority.”28 In January of 2002, a
highly respected Pennsylvania federal judge created a stir when he
initially declined to even admit expert identification of lifted
fingerprints.29 Although he later withdrew his decision, the judge
initially claimed that the techniques were not even reliable, much less
infallible.30
The point of these examples is not to ridicule “wrong” past
decisions but to illustrate the tension between judicial notice and its
application to evolving scientific principles. A discussion of this tension
lends itself to several conclusions. The first is that – even considering
that several of the above mentioned cases were decided under previously
existing judicial notice standards – there remain several problems
applying even the current judicial notice standard to scientific and
technical principles. In fact, because the problems are unique to these
dissenting) (citing Grice v. State, 151 S.W.2d 211 (Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 1941) as taking “judicial
notice of the conclusiveness of fingerprint identification”); State v. Fuller, 802 P.2d 599, 602 (Kan.
1990) (citing Tice v. Richardson, 644 P.2d 490 (Kan. App. 1982) (asserting that “[i]n selected cases,
a scientific technique is so broadly and generally accepted in the scientific community that a trial
court may take judicial notice of its reliability” and that “[s]uch is commonly the case today with
regard to ballistics tests, fingerprint identification, blood tests, and the like”). But see State v.
Wheeler, 1983 R.I. Super. LEXIS 169, *13 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1983) (stating that the pronouncement of
fingerprints as an “infallible means of identification . . . goes a bit too far”).
26. Inman v. State, 350 A.2d 582, 588 (Me 1976).
27. Inman, 350 A.2d at 588.
28. Id.
29. United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d. 492, 514 (E.D. Pa. 2002) vacated by United
States v. Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002). Judge Pollak’s initial decision in United
States v. Llera Plaza garnered considerable media attention. See, e.g., Richard Willing, Fingerprint
Evidence Faces New Test, USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 2002, at 4-A (quoting Justice Department lawyers
as saying that “[t]he ruling ‘could have a profound impact on the investigation and prosecution of
crime” unless it is reversed’”); Andy Newman, Judge Rules Fingerprint Evidence Cannot Be Called
a Match, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, AT A-14 (“A judge has ruled for the first time that fingerprint
evidence, a virtually unassailable prosecutorial tool for 90 years, does not meet the standards set for
scientific testimony . . . .”).
30. See Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d. at 515-16 (declining to admit latent fingerprint
identification stating that such evidence is “hard to square with Daubert” because it does not meet
“Daubert’s testing, peer review, and standards criteria”). Facing a blunt attack on the decision
from government lawyers, Pollak vacated the decision, issuing a new opinion on March 13, 2002.
See Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d. at 576; Willing, supra note 29, at 4-A ( stating that “in an unusually
blunt pleading, the team urges federal Judge Louis Pollak to reconsider his January decision”).
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principles, a new standard should be created specifically for them. The
new standard suggested in this Article would be more consistent with the
evolving nature of science and take into account judicial shortcomings
regarding scientific and technical principles.
Part I of this Article begins by introducing the concept of judicial
notice followed by a short background defining the scope of scientific
and technical principles. Part II addresses the problems created by the
current judicial notice standard. The standard’s text is problematic, and
courts’ diverse interpretations of the standard have also created
problems. Part III analyzes whether scientific and technical principles
merit a different judicial notice standard specifically for them. This Part
concludes that the inherent inconsistency of science and technical
knowledge with the current standard and the judicial shortcomings in
scientific/technical competence justify different legal treatment. Finally,
Part IV suggests a solution that would create a new standard for
scientific and technical principles. In addition, it creates a new officer of
the court, a neutral scientific adviser who would advise judges on
scientific and technical judicial notice decisions.
I. BACKGROUND
Before discussing the problems and solutions mentioned above, a
short introduction to judicial notice is necessary. After this, the scope of
scientific and technical principles must be determined.
A. A Brief Introduction to Judicial Notice
Through judicial notice, a judge accepts an adjudicative fact (fact
questions that would be decided by the jury if the proceeding were a jury
trial)31 or legislative fact (questions normally reserved for the judge)32
without requiring proof. 33 This is done for purposes of convenience.34
This article limits its scope to judicially noticed adjudicative facts.35 The
31. JOHN W. STRONG, 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, §328, at 491 (5th ed. 1999). See also
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 42 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Utility
Dist., 571 F. Supp. 1504, 1521 (D.C. Cal. 1983)).
32. Id.
33. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 851 (7th ed. 1999) (defining judicial notice as “[a] court’s
acceptance, for purposes of convenience and without requiring a party’s proof, of a well-known and
indisputable fact”).
34. Id.
35. It should be noted that the dividing line between adjudicative fact and legislative fact is
often tenuous. See STRONG, supra note 31, at 493 (stating that “any bright-line distinction between
adjudicative and legislative facts [tends to] dissolve in practice”).
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effect of judicial notice in civil cases is to bind the jury to accept as a
given the judicially noticed fact.36 In criminal cases, jurors are
encouraged, but not required, to accept the judicially noticed fact.37
Traditionally, two categories of fact questions qualified for judicial
notice: “facts generally known with certainty by all the reasonably
intelligent people in the community” and “facts capable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to sources of indisputable accuracy.”38
These categories are reflected in the judicial notice standard outlined in
Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b).39 Most states follow judicial notice
standards similar to FRE 201(b).40
B. Scope of Scientific/Technical Principles
The scope of scientific/technical principles needs to be defined
before discussing the difficulties of the current judicial notice standard’s
application to those principles. Fortunately, a resort to the writings of
the legions of legal scholars interested in the subject is unnecessary
because a simplistic definition will do.41 For this article, “scientific
principles” are synonymous with “scientific knowledge,” which is
alluded to in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and interpreted by Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and subsequent case law.42 In other
words, scientific principles are hypotheses tested by using the scientific
method.43 The scientific method consists of “generating hypotheses and

36. See FED. R. EVID. 201(g) (stating that “in a civil action or proceeding, the court shall
instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed”).
37. See FED. R. EVID. R 201(g) (stating that “[i]n a criminal case, the court shall instruct the
jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed”).
38. STRONG, supra note 31, at 492.
39. FED. R. EVID. R 201(b) (“A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable
dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.”)
40. See, e.g., infra notes 76 and 78 and accompanying text.
41. Legal scholars have spent many trees discussing this question—especially following
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See, e.g., Leslie Morsek, Get on Board
for the Ride of Your Life! The Ups, Downs, Twists, and the Turns of the Applicability of The
‘Gatekeeper Function’ to Scientific and Non-Scientific Expert Evidence: Kumho’s Expansion of
Daubert, 34 AKRON L. REV. 689 (2001); Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Appellate Craftsmanship in Evidence
Law: A Tribute to Justice Unis, 76 OR. L. REV. 21, 26 (1997) (“One of the most important aspects
of Justice Unis’ opinion in O’Key is that it addresses a crucial question sidestepped by the United
States Supreme Court in Daubert, namely, what qualifies as scientific evidence for purposes of
applying these new standards governing admissibility?”).
42. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-93.
43. Id. at 593.
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testing them to see if they can be falsified.”44
What exactly a technical principle is and how it differs from
scientific fact is difficult.45 Here, “technical principles” are the
“technical, and other specialized knowledge” alluded to in Federal Rule
of Evidence 702.46 In Kumho Tire Co. LTD v. Carmichael, Justice
Breyer, quoting Judge Learned Hand, stated that scientific and technical
knowledge differed from lay knowledge in that they show “general
truths derived from specialized experience” and usually rest “upon an
experience [ ] foreign [ ] to [the jury’s] own.”47 Justice Breyer put
testimony by engineers into this category;48 others have included certain
types of forensic evidence such as fingerprints and ballistics data as
well.49 For convenience and flow, the word “technical” is omitted from
the discussion of “scientific/technical principles.” By referring to
“scientific principles,” assume that this is a shorthand reference to both
scientific and technical principles. Having defined scientific principles,
a discussion of the significant problems created by applying these
principles to the current judicial notice standard can go forward.
II. PROBLEMS RELATED TO JUDICIAL NOTICE UNDER THE CURRENT
STANDARD
This Part outlines the textual inconsistencies Federal Rule of
Evidence (FRE) 201 suffers when it is applied to scientific principles.
Then, the problems caused by courts’ varying interpretations of FRE 201
and similar state evidence rules are discussed.
A. Textual Problems
FRE 201(a) suffers from poor word choice. Subsection (a) defines
the rule’s scope as only applying to “adjudicative facts.”50 Many
44. Id.
45. See Kumho Tire Co. LTD v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148 (1999) (describing the
difficulty in the legal system of “depend[ing] on a distinction between ‘scientific’ knowledge and
‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge[,]” explaining that “[t]here is no clear line that divides
the one from the others”).
46. Id. at 147.
47. Id. at 148-49.
48. Id. at 141.
49. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d. 492, 516 (E.D. Pa. 2002) vacated by
United States v. Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (classifying fingerprint evidence as
“technical”); Ohio v. Mack, 653 N.E.2d 329, 336 (Ohio 1995) (discussing the jury’s understanding
of the “technical ballistics report”).
50. FED R. EVID. 201(A) (“Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of
adjudicative facts.”).
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adjudicative facts, however, are not really “facts.” This is the case when
judicial notice is given of scientific or technical principles.51 This
concept will be discussed in more detail in Part III.
FRE 201(b) defines a clumsy two-prong standard that is
inconsistent with the nature of scientific principles generally. More
damningly, the two prongs directly conflict in certain instances. FRE
201(b) provides “[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.”52 The first prong, that the fact be “generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court . . . ,” provides
little benefit for scientific and technical principles.53 The very nature of
scientific principles is that they are based on “specialized experience”
that is “foreign in kind from the jury’s own.”54 If this experience is
foreign in kind from the jury, a rough sample of the general public, then
it is probably also foreign in kind from the general public.55
Consequently, a standard asking how universally the general public
knows a scientific principle provides almost no benefit in assessing the
reliability of those principles.56 The standard paradoxically inquires
about the general public’s unscrutinized common sense in a matter
admittedly outside of the general public’s experience. Such a standard
may potentially work a large amount of mischief.57
51. See infra notes 103-120 and accompanying text.
52. FED. R. EVID. R 201(B).
53. Id.
54. See Kumho Tire Co., LTD v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148 (1999) (quoting Judge
Learned Hand).
55. See Taylor v. La., 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975) (“it is part of the established tradition in the
use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the
community.”); Trevino v. Texas, 503 U.S. 562, 563 (1992) (reiterating that the Sixth Amendment
required that juries be a “fair cross-section of the community”).
56. See generally O’Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Company, 807 F. Supp. 1376, 1389
(C.D. Ill. 1992) (quoting Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 53 (1901) (“But how can the jury judge between two statements each
founded upon experience confessedly foreign in kind to their own? It is just because they are
incompetent for such a task that the expert is necessary at all.”); nsf.gov, Science &Engineering
Indicators—2002: Science and Technology: Public Attitudes and Public Understanding (2002),
http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind02/c7/c7h.htm (stating that only about 50 percent of NSF survey
“respondents knew that the earliest humans did not live at the same time as dinosaurs, [that] it takes
the Earth one year to go around the Sun, [that] electrons are smaller than atoms, [that] antibiotics do
not kill viruses,” that “60 percent of respondents agreed [with the statement] ‘some people possess
psychic powers or ESP,” and that “[] about 70 percent [] lack a clear understanding of the scientific
process”).
57. See infra notes 102-21 and accompanying text (showing that the judge may choose to
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The second prong declares a fact not subject to reasonable dispute
if it is “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”58 At first blush, this
might appear workable for scientific and technical principles.59 Who
does this “reasonable question[ing]?” How is the standard being
interpreted by courts? The standard is unclear whether it is the judge, or
scientists and technical experts knowledgeable about the “source” who
perform this function. Case law and treatises reflect this confusion.
McCormick on Evidence asserts that both the judge and the experts
should contribute to this decision, but the relative contributions from
these different groups vary considerably.60 McCormick writes that a
principle may be judicially noticed if “the principle is accepted as a valid
one in the appropriate scientific community,”61 but then continues that
“[i]n continuing the intellectual viability of the proposition . . . the judge
is free to consult any sources that he thinks are reliable.”62 Several
courts adhere to this interpretation.63 Other courts put greater emphasis
on experts’ opinions.64
B. Case Law’s Interpretation of the Standard Compounds the Problem
Courts and commentators also differ on what degree of unanimity is
required to judicially notice scientific principles. They have asked for
greater degrees of unanimity, requiring that the fact be accepted as
certain in the scientific community65 or beyond dispute,66 and lesser

follow the “common knowledge” prong of the test when the second prong would be more
appropriate).
58. FED. R. EVID. R 201(B).
59. Later a more searching analysis will show that this standard is also inherently inconsistent
with scientific and technical knowledge. See infra notes 103-115 and accompanying text.
60. See JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 330, at 394-95 (4th ed. 1992).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Sauls, 981 F. Supp. 909, 920 (D.C. Md. 1997); Clemmons v.
Bohannon, 918 F.2d 858, 865-68 (10th Cir.1990), vacated on other grounds, on reh. en banc, 956
F.2d 1523 (10th Cir. 1992).
64. See Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 331 (Ct. App. Md. 1993) (stating that scientific facts
must be “capable of immediate and certain verification by resort to sources whose accuracy is
beyond dispute”); Cholka v. Johnson, 270 N.W.2d 438, 440 (Ct. App. Wis. 1972), reversed on other
grounds, Wis. v. Johnson, 292 N. W.2d 835 (Wis. 1980) (“Scientific facts or principles are suitable
for judicial notice if they are accepted as certain in the appropriate scientific community.”).
65. See supra note 64.
66. See id. See also JOHN W. STRONG, 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 328, at 492 (5th ed.
1999) (stating that the inquiry should be “facts capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources of indisputable accuracy”).
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degrees,67 such as requiring that it just not be reasonably questioned68
and even surprisingly that it meet the Frye test.69
1. Precedential Value of Previous Judicial Notice Decisions
The standard’s varying court interpretations are problematic for two
reasons. First, the different interpretations complicate the inquiry into
the precedential value that judicially noticed principles should have.
Second, some of these varying interpretations are problematic for courts
to apply to scientific principles. Indeed, one interpretation, the Frye test,
has already been rejected for its inadequacy in dealing with science in
other contexts. Each is considered in turn.
Most courts recognize that a previously judicially noticed scientific
principle carries precedential value.70 This precedential value given to
previously noticed principles contradicts the discretion allotted to the
trial judge in deciding if the judicial notice standard is met.71 That
courts often follow different interpretations of an identical judicial notice
standard further complicates the matter.72 One court may interpret FRE
201’s “cannot be reasonably questioned” language to require “certainty”
while another follows a lesser standard, perhaps asking if it is
“reasonably disputable.”
By giving a previous judicial notice
determination precedential value, subsequent judges may judicially
notice something that would not have been noticed had the judge
conducted an independent analysis based on the tougher interpretation of
the standard.73 McCormick on Evidence hints at this problem in judicial
67. See Bruce W. Burton, The “O.K. Corral Principle”: Finding the Proper Role for Judicial
Notice in Police Misconduct Matters, 29 N.M. L. REV. 301, 311 (Spring 1999) (explaining that
some courts use judicial notice “more actively, either to instruct a jury or adopt by the court
technical facts where some level of consensus exists within the scientific community”).
68. In re Croneis, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4986, at *6 (Ohio App. 1998).
69. See infra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
70. See United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 1993) (recognizing the reliability of
the general theory and the reliability of DNA profiling techniques and encouraging other courts to
do so as well); In re Croneis, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4986, at *6 (stating that the judicially
recognized reliability of radar to detect speed “cannot reasonably be questioned [and] now serves as
precedent for the court within our jurisdiction to take judicial notice of the same”).
71. See United States v. Sued, 143 F.Supp.2d 346, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (recognizing the
“discretion to take judicial notice of fact not subject to reasonable dispute”); Maynard v. Pneumatic
Prod. Corp., 256 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (arguing that the district
court’s failure to take judicial notice of an agreement was an abuse of discretion).
72. See supra notes 64-69.
73. Korn, Law, Fact, and Science, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1080, 1108-09 (1966). Korn discusses
the implications to precedent of adopting lower standards of judicial notice such as “professional
acceptance” to judicial notice of science and stating, “[f]requently, however, decision of a technical
issue will produce knowledge that is viable and transmissible when severed from the particulars of

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 2
ONSTOTTFINAL.DOC

476

4/23/2007 9:24:50 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[40:465

noticing of scientific principles:
Puzzling enough in this regard, it has been noted that “nowhere can
there be found a definition of what constitutes competent or authoritative
sources for purposes of verifying judicially noticed facts.” And, it
should be noted that after a number of courts take judicial notice of a
principle, subsequent courts begin to dispense with the production of
these materials and to take judicial notice of the principle as a matter of
law established by precedent.74
2. Frye’s Application to Judicial Notice in State Court
The increasingly disfavored Frye general-acceptance test, usually
applied to admissibility questions, maintains a parallel existence in
judicial notice case law. State courts have been especially likely to use
Frye to decide judicial notice.75 This holds true even in states whose
evidence rules regarding judicial notices are similar and often even
identical to FRE 201. Even states that have adopted Daubert’s
admissibility standard, thereby rejecting the Frye test for admissibility,
continue to treat Frye’s application to judicial notice positively.
For example, in Colorado v. Shreck, the Colorado Supreme Court
allowed DNA evidence to be admitted under the Daubert standard.
Colorado Rule of Evidence 201(b) is identical to FRE 201(b).76 While
rejecting Frye’s application to the admissibility of scientific evidence,
the court noted in a parenthetical citing a previous case that “general
acceptance is a proper requirement for taking judicial notice of scientific
facts, but should not be a criterion for the admissibility of scientific
evidence.”77
the case at hand. Difficulties may still remain in gauging the level of certainty of scientific
knowledge . . . .” See generally Keeffe, Landis & Shaad, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial
Notice, 2 STAN. L. REV. 664, 667 (1950) (“General rules describing particular facts that can be
judicially noticed are worthless.”).
74. JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 330, at 496 (5th ed. 1999) (quoting
Comment, The Presently Expanding Concept of Judicial Notice, 13 VILL. L. REV. 528, 545 (1968)).
See also United States v. Bell, 335 F. Supp. 797, n. 2 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff’d 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.
1972); People v. Flaxman, 141 Cal. Rptr. 799, 803 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1977).
75. See Colorado v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 76 (Col. 2001); Hawaii v. Vliet a.k.a. “Spiderman,”
19 P.3d 42, 50 (Haw. 2001); Franklin v. Stevenson, 987 P.2d 22, 27 (Utah 1999); Furness v. Pois,
No. 99-P-0014, 2000 WL 1876655, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2000) (”While ‘general
acceptance’ is not a criterion for admissibility, it may allow a trial court to take judicial notice of
certain scientific facts.”).
76. COLO. R. EVID. 201(B). See also FED. R. EVID. 201(B).
77. Shreck, 22 P.3d at 76 (citing United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44, 53 (E.D. Pa.
1974). It should be noted that the court did not actually adopt the general-acceptance test for
judicial notice. However, just the unnecessary assertion that general acceptance is proper in

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss3/2

12

Onstott: Judicial Notice
ONSTOTTFINAL.DOC

2007]

4/23/2007 9:24:50 AM

JUDICIAL NOTICE

477

The Utah Supreme Court, also with an identical judicial notice rule
to FRE 201,78 applies the general acceptance test in judicially noticing a
scientific principle.79 In Franklin v. Stevenson, the Utah court held that
the trial court was correct not to judicially notice the reliability of
therapeutic methods claiming to help recover lost memories.80 The Utah
court stated that “neither the record nor our research indicate that these
techniques enjoy a general acceptance within the field.”81
Last year, the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed a district court
judge’s admittance of blood-alcohol-concentration level (BAC) expert
testimony.82 The court held the BAC testimony as reliable by
“employing judicial notice of what we believe to be general acceptance
of the Widmark formula in the scientific community and by the
courts.”83
3. The Problems Created by Applying Frye to Judicial Notice
Applying the Frye general-acceptance test in judicially noticing
scientific principles is questionable for several reasons. First, many
considerations that resulted in Frye being rejected as a test for
admissibility apply at least as strongly to the judicial notice question.
For example, Shreck inferred that Frye general acceptance was a proper
standard for judicial notice.84 But it then declared the standard “illsuited for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence, which, by
its nature, is ever-evolving.”85 The court continued, “[u]nder Frye, once
a scientific principle or discovery becomes generally accepted, it forever
remains accepted, despite improvements or other developments in
scientific technologies.”86 But the “ever-evolving” nature of science is
exactly why the general acceptance test is so ill-suited for judicial
notice.87 The court asserts that the general acceptance standard is not

deciding judicial notice but not admissibility is bafflingly inconsistent.
78. See UTAH R. EVID. 201; FED. R. EVID. 201.
79. See State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 398 (Utah 1989).
80. Franklin v. Stevenson , 987 P.2d 22, 28 (Utah 1999).
81. Id. at 28.
82. Hawaii v. Vliet a.k.a. “Spiderman,” 19 P.3d 42, 50 (Haw. 2001).
83. Id.
84. Colorado v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 76 (Col. 2001).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 398 (Utah 1989) (stating that once “a scientific
principle or test has achieved sufficient reliability that ‘judicial notice of that fact may be taken, . . .
foundational evidence as to the validity of the basic principles may be dispensed with in th[e]
jurisdiction in the future.’” (quoting Kofford v. Flora, 744 P.2d 1343, 1348 (Utah 1987)).
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adequate to guard against outmoded or questionable science in
admissibility determinations. But if this is true, then judicial notice
under the general acceptance standard will not only lead to admissibility
of outmoded scientific evidence, but imposed acceptance of such
principles by judicial fiat.88
In Utah, “general acceptance” does not serve as the ultimate test for
admissibility either. The Utah Supreme Court admits evidence not
qualifying for judicial notice if evidence satisfies the trial judge of its
“inherent reliability.”89
Although endorsing general acceptance’s
application to judicial notice, the court in State v. Rimmasch criticized
the trial courts, stating that it was “convinced that [trial courts]
sometimes admit ‘scientific’ evidence without scrutinizing its
foundations carefully.”90 Strangely, the court’s general-acceptance test
for judicial notice suffers from the same problem because courts are
likely to short shrift the analysis if there is precedent for judicially
noticing the principle.91 Moreover, the Frye test intrinsically does “not
scrutiniz[e] its foundations carefully”92 because it focuses on the
quantity of scholars subscribing to the theory and not the reliability of
the theory itself.93 Oddly, although it applies Frye to judicial notice
questions, Hawaii has also rejected general acceptance as the sole means
for determining admissibility.94
The second problem with general acceptance is that it magnifies
judicial shortcomings in the scientific area. A judge may not be able to
distinguish between the shades of gray regarding when something
becomes generally accepted. Once general acceptance becomes the test,
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 399.
91. See STRONG, supra note 74 and accompanying text (stating that “after a number of courts
take judicial notice of a principle, subsequent courts begin to dispense with the production of these
materials and to take judicial notice of the principle as a matter of law established by precedent”).
See also Kofford, 744 P.2d at 1348 (stating that once judicial notice of a fact is taken “foundational
evidence as to the validity of the basic principles may be dispensed with in th[e] jurisdiction in the
future”).
92. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 399.
93. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (explaining that general acceptance is only
one inquiry into whether a scientific principle is reliable).
94. See State v. Montalbo 828 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Haw. 1992).
Although general acceptance in the scientific field is highly probative of the reliability of
a scientific procedure, there are other indicators of suitability for admission at trial.
Examination of either the principle underlying scientific evidence, or of the procedure
itself, may be a sufficient basis upon which to admit or deny evidence at trial, depending
upon the procedure as well as upon the relevance of the evidence to issues at trial.
Id.
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the judge will have to assess what level of “generalness” is legally
appropriate if there are a few outliers with significantly different
opinions. And more difficulty, the judge will be asked to decide which
differing scientific opinions are qualitatively similar enough to conjoin
to form a generally accepted principle. This problem is similar to what
Justice Blackmun referred to in Daubert as the “twilight zone” problem
judges faced in deciding Frye questions.95 There, Justice Blackmun
described as “famous (perhaps infamous)” Frye’s assertion that the line
between when a scientific principle passes from being experimental to
demonstrable is a difficult one and that “[s]omewhere in this twilight
zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized.”96
Additionally, state courts following Daubert or similar standards97
create a third potential problem by treating general acceptance as an
acceptable judicial notice standard. The general acceptance of scientific
evidence is still a factor in the admissibility inquiry. In Daubert, Justice
Blackmun stated, “[f]inally ‘general acceptance’ can yet have a bearing
on the inquiry. A ‘reliability assessment does not require, although it
does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific community
and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within
that community.’”98
Because general acceptance is just one factor in determining
admissibility, other factors may override the general acceptance of a
scientific community. This was the case in United States v. Plaza.
There, the judge initially declined to admit expert testimony identifying
“latent” fingerprints, despite the fact that latent fingerprint identification
“ha[d] attained general acceptance within the American fingerprint
examiner community.”99 This creates a problem for states following
Frye for judicial notice and Daubert for admissibility: a scientific
principle may be “generally accepted” and thus qualify for judicial
notice, while paradoxically being inadmissible under Daubert.100
95. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993).
96. Id.
97. See supra note 94.
98. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d
Cir. 1985)).
99. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492, 515 (E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated by
United States v. Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 2002 WL 389163, (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“The failure of
fingerprint identifications fully to satisfy the first three Daubert factors militates against heavy
reliance on the general acceptance factor.”). Although Pollak, facing intense scrutiny, see supra
note 30, withdrew this opinion, it shows that it is possible for something to be generally accepted
and still be held to be too unreliable to be admissible.
100. No case has ever recognized this paradox. But this is the theoretical implication of
following Frye in judicial notice questions and Daubert or a similar standard in admissibility
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One last problem with the current judicial notice standard is that it
is internally inconsistent. FRE 201 provides that a “judicially noticed
fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1)
generally known [in the sense that they are ‘facts generally known with
certainty by all the reasonably intelligent people’]101 within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.”102 But what happens when a scientific principle clearly
satisfies one part of the standard but not the other?
III. IS A UNIQUE JUDICIAL NOTICE STANDARD SPECIFICALLY
APPLICABLE TO SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICALLY DERIVED FACTS
JUSTIFIED?
The discussion above raises questions about the current standard of
judicial notice as it applies to scientific and technical principles. But the
question remains, are these problems with judicial notice generally, or
are they specific to scientific expertise? At least two differences
between judicially noticed scientific principles and other judicially
noticed facts support the need for a specific standard relating to
scientific principles: inconsistency and competency.
A. The Current Standard’s Inherent Inconsistency with Science
The current judicial notice standard is incompatible with the nature
of science.103 The historical underpinnings of judicial notice concern the
questions.
101. See STRONG, supra note 31, at 369.
102. FED. R. EVID. 201(B).
103. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) states that it only applies to “judicial notice of adjudicative facts.”
(emphasis added). The term “adjudicative facts” has been interpreted by courts as simply meaning
“facts that, in a jury case, normally go to jury.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 42 (6th ed. 1990)
(citing Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 571 F. Supp. 1504, 1521 (E.D. Cal. 1983)).
But “fact,” included in this definition, has been interpreted by courts as “[a] thing done; an action
performed or an incident transpiring; an event or circumstance; an actual occurrence; an actual
happening in time or space or an event mental or physical; that which has taken place.” Id. at 591
(citing City of South Euclid v. Clapacs, 213 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio Mun. 1966)). The American
Heritage Dictionary defines “fact” in the following ways: “1. Something done. 2. Something
presented as objectively real. 3. Something that has been objectively verified.” THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 484 (2d College ed. 1982) (emphasis added). The word “verify” comes
from the Latin word verus and facere—literally, “to make true.” Id. at 1343. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines fact as “[t]he quality of being actual; actual existence or occurrence.” See
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 591 (6th ed. 1990). None of these sources assert that a fact is an
explanation of an actual occurrence. Therefore, the use of the word “fact” is misleading when
applying it to scientific and other technical knowledge.
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dichotomy of questions of fact, where it is said that the jury can produce
two right answers,104 and questions of law, where there is only one right
answer reserved for the judge.105 Judicial notice concerned fact
questions that were so “well-known by all reasonably intelligent people
in the community, or . . . so easily determinable with certainty from
unimpeachable sources . . .”106 that the existence of one right answer
signaled a question of law for the judge to decide.107 Given these
historical underpinnings that have lead to the current standard, it is not
hard to see how judicially noticed scientific principles acquire an aura of
truth.108
Unfortunately, proof of scientific principles can never reach the
level of “certainty” or “unimpeachability” where there is only one
“right” or “true” answer. Karl Popper made this point in his piece, The
Logic of Scientific Discovery.109 As Popper explains, it cannot be
assumed, “that by the force of [scientifically] ‘verified’ conclusions,
theories can be established as ‘true’, or even as merely ‘probable’. . .
[t]heories are never empirically verifiable.”110 Instead, science is a
method of deductive logic that is used to tell us what isn’t true, although
he recognizes that there are some problems with this assertion.111 For
Popper, science consists of inductive, flash-of-light hypotheses that are
tested and retested in an effort to discredit them but never conclusively
proven true.112
Thomas Kuhn depicts a similar problem, describing paradigmatic
shifts in science that result in science looking at entire fields differently.

104. See STRONG, supra note 31, at 491.
If there is produced at trial enough evidence upon which seriously to deliberate about
what actually happened in the past, and provided that in a civil case the evidence is not
so overwhelming as to make deliberation unnecessary, there is no scientific litmus by
which to assay the accuracy of the opposing versions of the affair. A verdict either way
is possible. In the law’s vernacular, we are met with a question of fact. . . . But this
compels the conclusion that a question of fact is one to which there are two right
answers.
Id.
105. See id. at 491 (stating that “the existence of one right answer signals a question of law”).
106. Harper v. Killion, 345 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
107. See id.
108. See generally State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1181 (Ariz. 1993) (“‘[S]cience’ is often
accepted in our society as synonymous with truth. . . .”).
109. See KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1968).
110. See id. at 27.
111. See id. at 42 (stating that although falsification may be avoided with auxiliary hypothesis,
the force of competition between different theories and the severity of the test will reveal the fittest
by “exposing them all to the fiercest struggle for survival”).
112. Id. at 30-32.
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Kuhn asserts that, “[l]ed by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new
instruments and look in new places. . . . [D]uring revolutions scientists
see new and different things when looking with familiar instruments in
places they have looked before.”113 To Kuhn, scientists observe
everything through a kaleidoscopic lens composed of their own biases
and predispositions, many adopted from the scientific community to
which they belong.114
Both Popper and Kuhn strongly suggest that science cannot prove
its principles as true. Rather, it is a purely deductive method warped by
its community’s own biases.
Science temporarily establishes
consistency, not long-term truth. It is an observational method subject to
change when the working hypothesis is eventually disproved or
modified.
As Popper suggests, it is not a principle’s verifiability, but its
falsifiability, that makes it valuable.115 A standard that only recognizes
facts that are “indisputable,”116 “certain,”117 or “not reasonably
question[able],”118 is inherently inconsistent with knowledge from a
method deriving its value from the continued questioning of a working
hypothesis. If judicial notice is concerned with letting only things that
are unquestionably true be noticed, then it should have no application to
scientific principles.119 Also, it seems odd to allow a person of no
established competence120 in the field declare information
unquestionable121 when that information’s source makes no similar
113. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 111 (2d ed. 1970).
114. Id.
115. See POPPER, supra note 109, at 40-41 (stating that “not the verifiability but the
falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a criterion of demarcation”).
116. See supra notes 64-65.
117. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
118. See FED. R. EVID. 201(B).
119. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., FAIGMAN, supra note 1, at 53.
Further complicating the law’s use of science, legal consumers of scientific research
often have little understanding of the product they are buying. In most areas of the law,
those using science have little or no training in the subject. This is true for judges,
jurors, legislators, and to a lesser extent, administrators.
Id. Michael L. Slack, Daubert and Its Progeny: Curbing Junk Science, or Promoting Junk Law,
ATLA Annual Convention Reference Materials, July 2001, at 4, available at WESTLAW, 1
Ann.2001 ATLA-CLE 1231.
You must ask yourself, “Is the judge better qualified to make scientific decisions? What
are his or her scientific credentials?” The answer to the former question is typically “no.”
The answer to the later [sic] is “he [or she] doesn’t have any.” Often, the judge has no
more scientific background than any other officer of the court.
Id.
121. See supra note 64.
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claim. That law continues applying standards inapposite to scientific
knowledge both shows inconsistency and supports the next premise—
that law is not competent in dealing with scientific principles.
B. Competency Shortcomings in Dealing with Scientific Principles
One system of categorization, dividing adjudicative facts into seven
distinct areas, may be helpful to illustrate judicial shortcomings in the
scientific arena. The seven categories are: Geographic; Matters of
History, Economy, Current Events, and Social Conditions; Value of
Property: Structure of Government, Office Holders, Public Documents,
and Corporate Charters; Court Operations and Records; Medical, Health,
and Biology; and Mechanical Facts and Natural Science122
1. Distinguishing Science from Common Sense
Some scientific principles are similar to principles arrived at
through everyone’s common experience. For example, that a particular
toxin in food has a certain carcinogenic effect on the lining of the
stomach is what can be referred to as a scientific or technical fact within
the meaning of this article. But the fact that common sense may note the
possibility of getting a stomachache from something that a person has
eaten is not scientific in the sense this article uses the term.123 Judges, as
members of the “common” sense, are presumably competent to issue
judicial notice concerning appropriate instances of the latter; otherwise
judicial notice would have no usefulness at all. Indeed, the courts’
willingness to issue judicial notice of geography,124 matters of history,125
and even a small part of the medical,126 health,127 and biology128
122. See Robert Banks, Jr. & Elizabeth T. Collins, Judicial Notice in Tennessee, 21 MEM. ST.
U. L. REV. 431, 453-70 (1991).
123. See Banks, supra note 122, at 461. See also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
124. See Coover v. Davenport, 1870 WL 2672, *7 (Tenn. 1870) (taking judicial notice of
divisions of counties in Tennessee); Sublette Exchange Bank v. Fitzgerald, 168 Ill.App. 240, *2 (Ill.
App. 1912) (stating that “the court will take judicial notice of the geographical features of this and
other states and countries, so far as the same may be fairly presumed to be within the general
knowledge of persons of ordinary intelligence living here”).
125. See Patterson v. Van Wiel, 570 P.2d 931, 936 (N.M. App. 1977) (stating that “common
knowledge includes matters of learning, experience, history, and facts of which judicial notice may
be taken”).
126. See Sparks v. Ribicoff, 197 F. Supp. 174, 176 (D.C. Va. 1961) (stating that that court
could only take judicial notice of medical matters that are common knowledge).
127. See McCue v. Lowe, 385 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (Ind. App. 1974) (“It is well-settled that trial
courts may take judicial notice of standard mortality tables which are matters of common
knowledge of which there is a certainty and of which there is no dispute.”).
128. See King v. King, 333 A.2d 135, 137 (R.I. 1975) (“It is common knowledge, of which the

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007

19

Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 2
ONSTOTTFINAL.DOC

484

4/23/2007 9:24:50 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[40:465

categories, is reflected in the common-sense aspect of judicial notice.129
And the judge’s presumed legal competence would justify judicial notice
of structure of Government, office holders, public documents, corporate
charters, and of court operations and records. However, judicial notice
of scientific matters is more problematic because it depends on what
Learned Hand described as “specialized knowledge” outside of the
realm of jury experience.130
This specialized knowledge is also often outside the realm of
judicial experience as well. Daubert’s dissent voiced precisely this
objection. Chief Justice Rehnquist questioned the wisdom of imposing
on judges “either the obligation or the authority to become amateur
scientists in order to perform that role.”131 Daubert’s critics often assert
that judges cannot adequately perform a gate-keeping function based on
known error rate, general acceptance, peer review, and the methodology
used without inviting into courtrooms science that is junky.132 But if
judges are unable to keep inherently unreliable science out of the
courtroom on one extreme, it would be odd to conclude that they are
capable of conclusively identifying and accepting inherently reliable
science on the other. The latter proposition is even more problematic for
the law because judges are not required to take evidence before issuing
judicial notice.133 And in the latter proposition, the jury is often not
available to “nullify”134 judicial mistakes.135
court may take judicial notice, that during the period when a boy is passing from childhood into the
teen years, he undergoes significant biological and emotional changes with a consequent broadening
of his intellectual horizons.”).
129. See supra notes 124-128.
130. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
131. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 601 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
132. See, e.g., Laurie Alberts, Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation: ‘Which Way Do We Go,
Judge?’, 12 VILL. ENVTL L.J. 33, 62 (2001) (“Court-appointed experts may be useful to help judges,
who ordinarily have little or no scientific background, to distinguish between ‘junk science’ and
science that is not, under Daubert, ‘grounded in science,’ ‘peer reviewed’ or ‘generally accepted’
because it is novel.”); Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Is Your Expert’s Testimony
Admissible UnderThe Supreme Court’s Recent Ruling in Kumho Tire Co.?, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. J.
May, 1999 (“The focus on ‘science’ caused many to question Daubert’s applicability, not to
mention its factors, which appeared tailor-made for ‘junk science.’”).
133. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 34 (stating that judicial notice allows the
court to dispense with the proof of a noticed principle).
134. See generally, John Clark, The Social Psychology of Jury Nullification, 24 LPSYR 39, 39
(2000) (“Jury nullification occurs when the jury acquits a defendant, blatantly disregarding evidence
presented at trial which clearly indicates the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.”);
Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1658 (2001) (“In contrast to [criminal]
verdicts of acquittal, trial and appellate judges do have the power to intercede in civil cases, but in
practice they may find it difficult to discern and correct instances of intentional jury departures from
their instructions.”).
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Even if judges are capable of applying a Daubert standard to
admissibility questions, capability in a judicial notice context remains
problematic. The difference involves the degree that the legal
community ties itself to a particular scientific principle.
Most
interpretations of judicial notice standards rely on language requiring
unquestionability,136 or indisputability,137 compared to a standard of
reliability and relevance under Daubert.138 A judge deeming a scientific
principle to be reliable and relevant that later proves not to be will be
less damning than a judge conclusively accepting a principle as
unquestionable when that principle later becomes questionable or even
manifestly unreliable.
2. Scientific Missteps May Compromise the Public’s Trust of the
Legal System
The lack of consistency and competency in judicially noticing
scientific principles may consequently affect public trust of the legal
profession. The tension between the scientific and legal communities
must be emphasized when analyzing the trust the public places in law to
govern its conduct. For a democratic government to establish rules that
the public will follow, public trust is essential.139 This leads to an
interesting paradox. In several studies, scientists, whose basic work is
not as dependent upon trust, continually outrank legal institutions and
government, whose very existence is dependent on trust and
credibility.140 One study comparing public confidence in the leadership
135. See FED. R. EVID. 201(g) (stating that judicial notice shall be conclusive in civil cases).
136. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Pottsville, No. CACR99-574, 2000 WL 177605, at *3 (Ark. Ct.
App. Feb. 16, 2000) (“Finally, appellate courts may take judicial notice of ‘the unquestioned law of
nature’. . . .”) (quoting Stephens v. State, 320 Ark. 426, 898 S. W.2d 435 (1995)); Fine Foods Inc. v.
Dahlin, 523 A.2d 1228, 1231 (Vt. 1986) (“The distance from the Old Newfane Inn to plaintiffs’
restaurant in Brattleboro is a fact which the trial court could accurately determine from
unquestionable sources, and, thus, judicial notices was within its discretion.”).
137. See, e.g., U.S. v. Herrera-Ochoa, 245 F.3d 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2001) (“‘Judicial notice may
be taken of any fact ‘not subject to reasonable dispute . . . .’”) (citing FED. R. EVID. 201(b)); Hinkle
v. Hartsell 509 S.E.2d 455, 458 (N.C. App. 1998) (“As the statute implies, a court may take judicial
notice of a fact if it is an ‘indisputable adjudicative fact.’”) (quoting In re D.S. 622 A.2d 954, 957
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)).
138. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 579-80 (1993) (“The Rules . . .
place appropriate limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence by assigning to the
trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is
relevant to the task at hand.”).
139. See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust
Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 109, 132
(1995) (drawing a correlation between the ability to govern and trust).
140. See nsf.gov, Science & Engineering Indicators 2006: Science and Technology: Public
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of various institutions found that the scientific community ranked second
among all studied institutions—ahead of the Supreme Court, education,
medicine, and even organized religion.141
While the law attempts to bring scientific evidence into many of the
decisions it makes, it does so at its own peril. Trust may be severely
compromised by one mistaken decision amidst a slew of correct ones.142
Thus, judges, whose competency in dealing with scientific and technical
evidence is already widely questioned,143 may suffer a net trust loss,
even if they manage to get the scientific or technical question right more
often than wrong in issuing judicial notice. As Paul Slovic points out in
his book, The Perception of Risk, “Trust is fragile. It is typically created
rather slowly, but it can be destroyed in an instant—by a single mishap
or mistake. Thus, once trust is lost, it may take a long time to rebuild it
to its former state.”144
What has been created by these consequences is the proverbial
Catch-22. Science is already a more trusted leader than law in making
many decisions.145 This often puts pressure on law to use science in
decision-making. To efficiently use science and technical knowledge in
the courtroom, judicial notice must be an available tool, or many
proceedings will become bogged down by lengthy proofs of scientific
principles.146 But because the law lacks competence in evaluating

Attitudes and Public Understanding , http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/c7/c7s3.htm (last visited
May 9, 2006). See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181, 225 n.157 (1999) (quoting Kristina Petkova & Pepka Boyadjieva, The
Image of the Scientist and Its Function, 3 PUB. UNDERSTAND. SCI. 215, 215, 222 (1994)) (reporting
that “‘[m]any leading sociologists of science have pointed out that the scientist is portrayed by
society as an almost mythological figure’ and concluding, based on an empirical study, that ‘the
image of the scientist has been described in an elevated way with elements of idealization’”); Id.
(quoting Daniel S. Greenberg, Thumbs Up for Science, WASH. POST, July 8, 1996, at A15) (stating
that “results of polls taken between 1983 and 1995 that reveal the public consistently ranks
scientists well ahead of legislators with regard to their ‘confidence in the people running various
institutions’”).
141. nsf.gov, Science & Engineering Indicators 2006: Science and Technology: Public
Attitudes and Public Understanding, http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/c7/fig07-19.htm (last
visited May 9, 2006).
142. See Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust and Democracy, in PAUL SLOVIC, THE
PERCEPTION OF RISK 320-23 (2000) (comparing the effect that positive and negative events at a
nuclear power plant have on public trust).
143. See supra note 120.
144. See Slovic supra note 142.
145. See Wagner, supra note 140 at 225 n.157.
146. See generally Robert D. Leinbach, Note, Novel Scientific Evidence After Reese v. Stroh:
The Washington Supreme Court’s Love Affair With Frye, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1151 n.181
(1996) (“[T]he use of judicial notice will minimize the need for judges to engage in time-consuming
investigations. . . .”).
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scientific principles, judicially noticing those principles may result in a
net loss of public trust.147 This possibly remains true even if judges are
right more often than they are wrong.148 And it is potentially true even if
the law’s application of judicial notice to science—as clumsy as it may
be—results in a net gain in cases being decided correctly and efficiently.
IV. A SOLUTION TO THE DILEMMA
An acceptable solution to this dilemma must directly address the
two components that make judicial notice of scientific principles so
problematic—inconsistency and competency.
A. A New Judicial Notice Standard for Scientific Principles
The inconsistency problem can be fixed by creating a new judicial
notice standard for scientific principles. FRE 201 ½ would be created
specifically for scientific and technical judicial notice questions. It
would have the following standard:
Based on current scientific understanding, the principle clearly and
convincingly appears reliable because of 1. observed consistency
during rigorous testing, 2. acceptance as apparently reliable by nearly
all people in that specific field, and 3. without significant objection by
people in science or technology generally.

This standard is desirable for its consistency with scientific and
technical fields. It is preferable to the old one because it is honest about
the value of scientific principles in the legal system. Scientific
principles can only “appear reliable” “based on current scientific
understanding,” they cannot be “certain,” “unquestionable,” or
“indisputable.”149 By including this limitation on judicially noticed
principles, the standard allows for science to change and for courts to
adapt to it. In short, there will be no more need for the uncomfortable
confession that what courts had previously deemed indisputable turned
out to be very disputable. And judges will not be stuck with balancing
the same shortsighted indisputability claim for other scientific principles
against the need for efficiency. Additionally, requiring the injury to be
“based on current scientific understanding” would encourage the
decision maker not to conduct such a cursory analysis to stale principles

147. See supra notes 143-144.
148. Id.
149. See supra notes 103-121.
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recognized by judicial notice precedent.150
The standard’s insistence on the clear and convincing appearance of
reliability differentiates the standard from ordinary admissibility
decisions under Daubert. To justify binding the jury to accept the
principle with no evidentiary presentation, it should have a convincing
appearance of reliability judged by current scientific standards. It should
also withstand rigorous testing attempting to discredit it, as required in
the first prong of the test.
The principle should also be accepted as apparently reliable by
“nearly all” people in a particular scientific field. And it should not be
objected to by other areas of science or technology. These requirements
assure that one field of science wholeheartedly endorses a particular
principle before it is judicially noticed, while also assuring that
principles subject to inter-field disputes regarding their reliability will
not be judicially noticed. This would help alleviate the problem
regarding judicial notice of fingerprint identification that is endorsed by
one field while questioned by others.
Some may object that the last prong of the standard resembles the
Frye standard I have already criticized. There are three key differences
with this new standard. First, many of the objections to the Frye
standard relate to judicial competence to determine “general
acceptance.”151 Those problems are greatly diffused by a second
solution discussed below.152 Second, the Frye test is undesirable partly
because it was the only test used for judicial notice. Even Daubert
admits that some acceptance standard is relevant in gauging a scientific
principle’s apparent reliability.153 Third, the consistency through
rigorous testing requirement provides a check on the acceptance prong
of the test by ensuring that the legal system will look underneath
acceptance to also check the perceived reliability of the principle. And
finally, the new standard specifies that acceptance is required by “nearly
all” of a particular field. Thus, while it does suffer from a vagueness
objection, it doesn’t suffer it to the same degree that a general
acceptance standard would.154

150. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 95-96.
152. See infra notes 155-161 and accompanying text.
153. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (stating that general
acceptance is still a relevant factor in gauging the reliability of scientific evidence).
154. General acceptance could mean anything from a bare majority to unanimity. The “nearly
all” language at least implies that a bare majority would be unacceptable.
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B. Alleviating the Competency Problem Through a New Officer of the
Court
The competency problem could be addressed in at least two ways.
The first way would require judges and other officers of the court to
complete a scientific education requirement. This requirement is
certainly not unknown in the law. Patent lawyers have such a
requirement.155 Given the proliferation of science in the courtroom, this
requirement seems to make sense. But this solution is probably
unworkable for several reasons. First, in order to educate, some amount
of initial aptitude is necessary. Many argue that the very reason many
judges and lawyers chose the field in the first place was their lack of
aptitude or interest in scientific and other technical areas.156 Second,
judges already on the bench would have to be subject to the new
education requirement for it to be effective. It seems likely that such a
solution would be subject to considerable institutional resistance. Third,
the scientific and technical fields are becoming increasingly
specialized.157 It is questionable whether judges would have the time to
maintain their current legal work and then learn enough scientific
knowledge to competently dispose of scientific judicial notice matters.
This is especially true considering the docket pressures that most judges
already face.158 Indeed, if these “amateur scientists” screw up, as they
inevitably will, the same trust consequences are likely to occur as in the
current system. Judges and law lose credibility, with no net effect on the
credibility of the scientific field itself.
The second solution to the dilemma is more desirable. Create new
officers of the court—neutral scientific advisers. This adviser would be
155. See
General
Requirements
Bulletin,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/oed/grb0210.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2002) (requiring
a Bachelor’s Degree in specific scientific or technical areas to register to take the patent bar).
156. See FAIGMAN, supra note 1, at 53.
All judges and most legislators and administrators come from the rank of lawyers. These
are people who typically ended up in law school because their prospects in science and
math were dim. Fewer than 10 percent of all students attending law school have
undergraduate degrees in fields that require substantial math and science training, such
as the natural sciences, math and statistics, computer science and engineering.
Id. at 53-54.
157. See Marc P. Press, Premenstrual Syndrome as a Defense in Criminal Cases, 1983 DUKE
L.J. 176, 179 n.23 (1983) (“In light of today’s rapid increase of scientific specialization and
progress, . . . not only are the courts unable to determine the accuracy of the newest devices, but
many of the experts themselves are unable to keep abreast of all the developing techniques.”).
158. See Margaret Martin Barry, Conference, Access to Justice: On Dialogues With the
Judiciary, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1089, 1101 (2002) (“Respect for the litigants is often lost in the
process of moving crowded dockets. . . .”).
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a lawyer with appropriate scientific credentials. The new officer would
serve a specified number of courts on judicial notice questions within his
or her general competence.159 Under the new system, before the judge
could issue judicial notice of a scientific principle, the adviser would
provide the judge with non-party advice on the decision. If the judge
were to rule contrary to the adviser, the adviser would produce a formal,
but non-binding, dissent to be used in any subsequent appeal. Such a
system continues to allow judges to decide whether judicial notice will
be issued in the first place, while reducing the likelihood of noticing
something based on outdated or unreliable science. By allowing the
judge to control the initial question of whether to submit the judicial
notice question to the adviser, the institutional resistance from the legal
community is likely to be less daunting because less power is given up
than if the issue were totally in the hands of the adviser.
The system would still allow the judge to deny judicial notice to
deserving scientific principles. But this error is not as damning to the
trust of the legal institution. Even if judicial notice were denied, the
evidence of the principle would still possibly be admissible under
Daubert.160 Because admissibility would still be possible, the judge
would not be taking away a question from the jury based on mistaken
application of scientific principles. Therefore, the mistake of denying
judicial notice would still allow the legal process to properly apply the
scientific principle to correctly decide the case.
The new system also protects the legal process’ use of science if
both the judge and the scientific expert mistakenly issue judicial notice
of a principle. When both the judge and expert are mistaken, the judge’s
trust loss may not be as severe because it managed to fool the scientist
professional as well. The zero-sum game is replaced by win-win or
lose-lose in the competition for public confidence in leadership abilities.
The adviser also safeguards the law’s public trust in another way.
Scientists and technical professionals may be less amenable to flogging
one of their own for a mistake than they are to mocking the law’s use of
science. By tying one of their own to the judicial notice two-by-four, we
give them less incentive to light fires under the legal edifice.
Some may object to the cost of hiring a new officer of the court.
159. It is logical to assume that the adviser’s specific expertise will not reach every specialized
area of science. But at the very least, this adviser would be starting with a well-developed
foundation concerning basic principles of scientific knowledge and would presumably be more
likely to have the aptitude and interest necessary to learn more about the field if necessary. Such a
system would be much better than the one that is now in place.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
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But these costs should be weighed against the current system’s
inefficiencies in letting judges mistakenly apply scientific principles to
distribute economic wealth and justice. Indeed, such concerns should be
balanced against the possibility that many judges, perceiving their own
lack of skill in the area, do not issue judicial notice in many instances
where it is warranted.161 By allowing judges to simply raise the judicial
notice question and seek counsel of the more-knowledgeable adviser, it
may well be that judicial notice is issued more often, lessening the time
spent litigating an issue and consequently lowering the cost of a legal
dispute.
In short, the new standard provides a more consistent alternative in
issuing judicial notice of scientific principles. It does this by dealing up
front with the changing nature of science and being honest about the
temporary nature of the reliability finding. The neutral adviser will also,
in my view, considerably improve competency in judicially noticing
scientific principles. It will also protect against junk-science submitted
by party-affiliated experts. Ultimately, the changes will allow the law to
keep pace with scientific understanding. Until then, law will continue its
unrealistic hope that today’s scientific principles will prove less subject
to change than yesterday’s. After all, a judge in 2001 would never regret
stating that “DNA evidence [ ] indisputably linked” the suspect to the
crime.162

161. See generally, Johnson v. Com. 12 S.W.3d 258, 267 (Ky. 1999) (Stumbo, J., dissenting)
(“Rather, judicial notice of scientific evidence should be reserved for the rare occasion when the
evidence sought to be admitted is seemingly beyond dispute, such as, for example, evidence that the
sun rises every day in the east, or acknowledgment of the law of gravity.”); U.S. Sugar Corp. v.
Henson, 787 So.2d 3, 16 (Fla. App. 2000) (“Nonetheless, courts rarely take judicial notice of a
scientific theory or scientific technique.”).
162. Harris v. State, 749 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ind. App. 2001). See also Debra C. Moss, DNA: The
New Fingerprints, A.B.A., May 1, 1988 at 66 (stating that “[i]n the family law area, [DNA] means a
woman suing for paternity can establish conclusively whether the respondent is the father”).
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